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Abstract
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are commonly used as an authenti-
cation mechanism. An important security requirement is that PINs should
be hard to guess for an attacker. On the other hand, remembering several
random PINs can be difficult task for an individual. We evaluate several
dictionary-based methods of choosing a PIN. We experimentally show that
these methods are far from ideal with respect to expected covering of the
PIN space and the entropy of PINs. We also discuss two methods for con-
structing easy to memorize PIN words for randomly chosen PINs.
Keywords: PIN, Entropy, Access control, Memorization, Hidden Markov
model
1. Introduction
Various forms of authentication are used in our everyday life. Some
of them employ a PIN, i.e. a string of digits with fixed length, usually
between 4 and 6. PINs are used in various applications: for cardholder
verification in financial services [3], for authorized personnel verification in
physical access control systems, for SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card
owner verification in mobile phones, etc. The ubiquitous nature of PINs and
the fact that a simple numpad is often the only practical option in various
environments mean that PINs stay here as a viable authentication method
for a long time.
The security of PIN based authentication depends on multiple factors
and subjects involved in a particular application. A comprehensive descrip-
tion of issues in PIN management throughout its entire life cycle can be
found in ISO standard 9564 [4] or standards proposed by PCI Security Stan-
dards Council, such as [7]. Practically oriented guidelines on PIN security
can be found in [10]. A user of an application usually controls only his/her
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own PIN and not other security measures. Therefore there are some com-
mon recommendations for users, such as never share your PIN with anyone,
memorize your PIN (do not write it down), select a PIN that cannot be
easily guessed, be aware of shoulder surfing, etc.
Recently published study on frequency of 4-digit PINs [1] reveals that
most people fail at the one of the basic recommendation: your PIN should
be unguessable. However the recommendations give almost no hints on
how to actually choose a PIN. They say how not to select a PIN, e.g. using
sequential digits such as 1234 (ranking as the most frequent PIN in the cited
study), repetitive digits such as 1111 or 0000 (five spots in top 10), birthdays
or anniversaries (each 19?? combination can be found in the top 20% of
the dataset in the cited study), etc. In an ideal world everyone would use
and remember randomly and uniformly generated PINs of required length.
Nevertheless, our ability to memorize random PINs is limited, even more so
when an individual must remember multiple PINs for distinct applications.
The problem can be approached from two different sides:
1. Methods of generating easy to remember PINs, usually with some
alpha-numeric aids (e.g. various tips of this kind can be found in
[8]). The advantage of this approach lies in easy to apply techniques.
On the contrary, it is usually difficult to assess the entropy of PINs
constructed this way. A variant of this approach is using PINs derived
from passwords [5, 6].
2. Methods to memorize randomly chosen PINs. This ensures highest
entropy of used PINs. On the other hand, an individual must develop
or learn some memorization technique in order to deal with large num-
ber of PINs. For example, there are several known techniques usually
aimed at remembering a long sequences of digits, such as Major Sys-
tem or Dominic System. These techniques are also useful in situations
when a user is not allowed to change the PIN.
Low entropy of a PIN yields higher success probability of the guessing
attack. A common security measure is to limit the number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts, usually to three, and block the access or the device
after reaching this number. Even with such measure in place, users should
use as unpredictable PINs as possible.
Our contribution and results. In this paper we focus on the problem of
choosing a PIN. Formally, a PIN is an element from the set {0, 1, . . . , 9}n,
for an integer n. The value n is the PIN length and we use the most common
values n = 4 and n = 5 in our experiments. A PIN word is a string of
alphabetic characters of length n that is translated by some mapping into a
PIN. We mostly use the common mapping from letters to numbers offered
by keyboards of ATMs, Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminals or mobile phones.
Other mappings can be easily employed in applications by using pictures
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attached to an authentication dialog or by customizing the keyboard of an
authentication device.
The contribution of the paper can be summarized as follows.
1. We experimentally estimate the entropy and the coverage of the PIN
space for dictionary PINs, i.e. PINs obtained from PIN words of the
corresponding length from a dictionary (Section 2). We analyze dic-
tionaries of various sizes and languages (English, French, German and
Slovak). Even though the results are significantly influenced by the
size of a dictionary, obtained entropies and PIN space coverings are
unsatisfactory in comparison to ideal values. On the other hand, the
results are comparable with the method of deriving PINs from pass-
words [5, 6]. In addition, using dictionary PINs is certainly better
than using birthday or some of the most frequent PINs (e.g. there are
at most 5 dictionary PINs in the top 20 most frequent PINs from [1]).
2. We test various natural ideas to improve the covering and the entropy
of dictionary PINs in Section 3. The experiments show mostly negli-
gible improvements for individual ideas.
3. Another approaches are explored in Section 4: translation of randomly
generated PINs to PIN words or PIN phrases with the aim that these
will be easier to remember. Our first proposal is the construction of
PIN words using the hidden Markov model of the particular language.
The second approach is to construct PIN phrases from PINs.
2. Statistics of Dictionary PIN Codes
In this section we analyze the statistics of dictionary PINs. We use the
spell-checking dictionaries from LibreOffice suite as a source of PIN words
in our experiments. We analyze four languages: English (US dictionary, ver.
3.0), French (modern dictionary, ver. 4.8), German (frami dictionary, ver.
2012.06.17) and Slovak (ver. 2011.02.28). All dictionaries use supplemental
affix files to facilitate spell-checking. However, we took our input just from
the dictionary (dic) files alone. The dictionary files differ significantly in
number of words:
Dictionary #words
English 797 865
French 72 474
German 220 030
Slovak 264 944
One can certainly use other dictionaries, or individual’s vocabulary can
contain words not available in a spell-checking dictionary, or one can combine
multiple dictionaries (knowing foreign languages), etc. On the other hand,
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the size of common person’s vocabulary is usually much smaller than the
number of words in considered dictionary files [2, 11].
In order to allow a translation of the particular word into a PIN we
transform each word according to the following rules:
1. remove diacritics from all letters (e.g. sˇ 7→ s, o¨ 7→ o, c¸ 7→ c etc.),
2. strip all non-alphabetic characters (e.g. remove apostrophes etc.)
3. convert word to lowercase.
Let us note that words that differ only in accented letters were counted as
distinct words (e.g. “mole” and “moˆle” in French dictionary), but words
that differ only in the case of their letters were counted as the same word
(e.g. “Amos” and “amos” in English dictionary). There were also some
special treatments of particular dictionary files. For example, the ending
’s was striped from all words in English dictionary. Moreover, words with
multiple occurrences were counted just once.
The experiments use a standard (the most common) mapping of English
alphabet into digits:
a,b,c 7→ 2 m,n,o 7→ 6
d,e,f 7→ 3 p,q,r,s 7→ 7
g,h,i 7→ 4 t,u,v 7→ 8
j,k,l 7→ 5 w,x,y,z 7→ 9
Obviously, omission of digits 0 and 1 means that it is impossible to cover
all PINs. Comparison of basic facts for PINs (with length 4 or 5) using 10
vs. 8 digits alphabet is summarized in Table 1. The entropy is calculated as
Shannon entropy (in bits), assuming that the possible PINs are distributed
uniformly.
All digits 8 digits
PIN length #PINs Entropy #PINs Entropy
4 10 000 13.29 4 096 12.00
5 100 000 16.61 32 768 15.00
Table 1: Number of possible PINs and the corresponding entropy
Besides using words not in dictionaries, one can also use different and
more complicated rules to transform words into PINs. For example occa-
sional/randomly chosen translations like l/i 7→ 1, o 7→ 0 can cover other PINs
and potentially increase the entropy. Even more complicated rules can be
imagined for alphabets with diacritics (e.g. adding/subtracting 1 from digit
value when the character contains a diacritical mark) – the possibilities are
almost endless. Some ideas are evaluated in Section 3. However, we try
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to keep things as simple as possible here and we believe that this approach
provides good estimates for the entropy of dictionary PINs.
The results obtained for particular dictionaries and PINs of the length 4
and 5 are presented in Table 2. The table shows the number of PIN words
(i.e. dictionary words of the required length translated into a PIN), the
number of unique PINs obtained from these PIN words, the covering (as a
percentage of all possible PINs rounded to an integer value) and the entropy
of such PINs. The entropy is calculated from frequencies of particular PINs.
English French German Slovak
PIN length 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5
#PIN words 10 484 25 104 1 571 3 595 1 982 3 562 4 537 10 452
#PINs 3 101 12 979 1 073 2 757 1 334 3 005 2 225 7 133
Covering 31% 13% 10% 3% 13% 3% 22% 7%
Entropy 11.28 13.37 9.86 11.28 10.20 11.46 10.82 12.60
Table 2: Statistics for dictionary PINs
The table clearly shows that the results are influenced by the size of
the particular dictionary. However, the differences in entropies are not as
big as one would expect considering the differences in the number of PIN
words (e.g. compare results for English and French dictionaries). It seems
that after some threshold, extending dictionary/vocabulary adds only little
to the overall entropy of resulting PINs. There is also a large gap between
theoretical maximums from Table 1 and values shown in Table 2. Moreover,
it is substantially harder to cover the PIN space with increasing PIN length.
We observe covering only 13% of the entire space of possible PINs, for the
PIN length 5 and the largest dictionary. Therefore, we focus on possible
remedies in the following sections.
Interesting observations can be made by looking at the most frequent
PINs. As expected, the PINs reflect unbalanced distribution of letters in
a language, combined with distribution of opening/closing letters in dictio-
nary words. Therefore, the most frequent PINs usually show some patterns,
especially for the first and the last digits. For example, the digit 9 (be-
sides expected digits 0 and 1) is missing in the most frequent PINs in all
languages, thanks to relatively low frequency of letters w, x, y, and z. For
all dictionaries, we present the most frequent PINs obtained from analyzed
dictionaries together with examples of the corresponding PIN words in the
following list:
English
Length 4: The most frequent PINs are 2667 (for words such as “amor”,
“amos”, “cons”, etc.), 5277, 7377, 7467 and 7667, each one occurring
5
15 times. With one exception, each PIN with frequency greater than
13 ends with digit 7. Moreover, digits 7 and 6 are the most frequent
digits among these PINs.
Length 5: The most frequent PINs are 72737 (“paper”, “pards”,
“raper”, etc.), 72937, 76737, 46637 and 22737, each one occurring
14 times.
French
Length 4: The single most frequent PIN, with 9 occurrences, is 7243
(“page”, “paie”, “sage”, “saie”, etc.). The most frequent PINs end
with digit 3, caused by words mostly ending with letter ‘e’.
Length 5: Having 7 occurrences, the most frequent PINs are 66473
(“Moire”, “mo¨ıse”, “omise”, etc.) and 27383. Similarly to the previous
case, the usual end digit is 3.
German
Length 4: The most frequent PINs are 5246 (“jahn”, “kain”, “lahm”,
etc.) and 5346, both with 7 occurrences.
Length 5: The most frequent PINs are 62436 (“magen”, “ma¨hen”,
“nagen”, etc.) and 62437, both with 6 occurrences. The usual end
digits are 3, 6 and 7 for both PIN lengths.
Slovak
Length 4: There is only one PIN with 11 occurrences: 7824 (“puch”,
“su´ci”, “ru´cˇi”, etc.). Eight most probable PINs start with digit 7.
Length 5: With frequency 9, the PIN 78652 (“stoja”, “stoka”, “sˇto´la”,
etc.) is the most probable. The most frequest PINs start with digits
7 or 8 and end with digits 2 or 8.
An interesting result is the comparison of dictionary PINs with top 20
most frequent PINs from the study [1]. Let us note that the study analyzed
the PINs with length 4, and according the study almost 27% of all PINs can
be guessed by testing PINs from the top 20. There are only 5 dictionary
PINs that can be found in the top 20 for English dictionary (4444, 2222,
3333, 6666, 8888). For French, German and Slovak dictionaries we get 4, 3,
and 5 dictionary PINs in the top 20, respectively. Similarly to English, all
such dictionary PINs are repetition of four identical digits. Small number
of dictionary PINs in the top 20 can be partially explained by the fact that
11 PINs from the top 20 contain digits 0 or 1.
3. Improvements
The observed covering of dictionary PINs ranges, mostly depending on
the dictionary size, from 11% to 31% for the PIN length 4, and from 3%
6
to 13% for the PIN length 5 (see Table 2). In this section we evaluate
some ideas to improve this situation. Let us emphasize that these ideas are
not a complete list of what can be done. One can certainly come up with
other methods to increase the PIN space covering as well as the entropy of
resulting PINs. This section illustrates what results can be expected with
some natural ideas.
A polyglot method. This method draws a PIN word uniformly from the union
of multiple dictionaries. Of course, there are few people having such vocab-
ulary. On the other hand, with some help of a software that offers user a
randomly chosen PIN word, this method can be potentially used by every-
one (with additional benefit of learning new foreign words). We decided to
combine all dictionaries (English, French, German and Slovak) in our ex-
periment. Certainly, obtained PINs cannot cover more than the sum of the
coverings for particular dictionaries, e.g. 26% for the PIN length 5. The
results are rather disappointing – the following table shows only a moderate
improvement for PIN lengths 4 and 5 in comparison to the single dictionary
method with the largest dictionary (English dictionary in our experiments).
PIN length 4 5
#PIN words 18 574 42 713
#PINs 3 476 16 568
Covering 35% 17%
Entropy 11.38 13.63
Table 3: Results for polyglot method
Translations covering digits 0 and 1. This idea was briefly mentioned in
Section 2. In order to cover unused digits 0 and 1 we extend the mapping
from letters to digits. We choose to map letters ‘l’ and ‘i’ to 1 and letters
‘o’ and ‘z’ to 0; these mappings were chosen as easy to remember. This
simple method provides only a slight improvement of coverings for particular
dictionaries and PIN lengths. The biggest change was the increase from 31%
to 46% for English dictionary and the PIN length 4. The improvement was
rather negligible for all other combinations of dictionaries and PIN lengths
– after rounding to integers, the covering percentages for the PIN length 5
changed from 13% to 16% for English dictionary, and remained unchanged
for French, German and Slovak dictionaries.
Change letter mapping. The easiest way to cover all digits is to stretch a
mapping from alphabet to digits. In order to preserve usability, the con-
secutive sets of letters should be mapped to consecutive digits, considering
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the shape of particular numpads. An example of possible mapping for a
common numpad shape is shown in Figure 1.
a,b 7→ 1 c,d 7→ 2 e,f 7→ 3
g,h,i 7→ 4 j,k,l 7→ 5 m,n 7→ 6
o,p,q 7→ 7 r,s,t 7→ 8 u,v,w 7→ 9
x,y,z 7→ 0
Figure 1: Example of stretched mapping
Interestingly, the results for this mapping are very similar to the results of
previous method. In case of English dictionary, this method increases the
coverings from 31% to 48% for the PIN length 4, and from 13% to 16%
for the PIN length 5. For Slovak dictionary, we observed a slight increase
from 7% to 8% for the PIN length 5. The covering percentage remained
unchanged for other two dictionaries.
Prefixes or suffixes. Another idea focuses on enlarging the space of PIN
words. A straightforward approach is to use every dictionary word with
length equal or greater than desired PIN length. The actual PIN words are
then just the prefixes or the suffixes of these words. Both methods increase
the covering of PINs with similar results. On the other hand, the distribu-
tions of resulting PINs are skewed, because of common prefixes or suffixes
(e.g. “meth–” or “–ness” for English). This yields a lower entropy of PINs
generated by the suffix method regardless of dictionary and PIN length, and
by the prefix method applied to English and Slovak dictionaries regardless
of PIN length. Hence, the methods do not present real improvement over
the standard approach from Section 2. Table 4 shows the statistics for prefix
method applied to English and French dictionaries.
English French
PIN length 4 5 4 5
Covering 39% 23% 29% 11%
Entropy 10.56 13.80 10.39 12.43
Table 4: Results of prefix method for English and French dictionaries
Combination. As another approach to improve the covering and the en-
tropy of PINs, we try to combine multiple methods. We use a combination
of polyglot and prefixes methods with changed mappings of individual let-
ters. The results can be viewed as some kind of “upper bounds” of what
can be achieved by these and similar approaches. This combined approach
reached the covering 86% and 50% for PIN lengths 4 and 5 respectively.
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The corresponding entropies of generated PINs were 11.43 and 13.78 re-
spectively. These values are far from the ideal values of uniformly generated
PINs. Therefore, we try completely different approaches in Section 4.
Morphing PIN words with a digit. Unsurprisingly, better covering and en-
tropy can be achieved by more complicated methods. Take for example the
following procedure: choose a PIN word and replace single letter at random
position by some random digit. This way you can morph the PIN word
“paper” into “p7per” (or “ppper” if you want), “pape0”, “1aper” etc. Then
the morphed PIN word yield the PIN using standard mapping (a digit trans-
lates to itself). Hence you can get 40 or 50 PINs from a single PIN word of
length 4 or 5, respectively. The results obtained by this methods, presented
in Table 5 for the PIN length 5, are even better than the results of combined
approach.
English French German Slovak
Covering 67% 40% 44% 60%
Entropy 15.22 14.47 14.79 15.12
Table 5: Statistics for morphing method (PIN length 5)
On the other hand, this method can be too complex for a common user
((s)he must remember the PIN word, the position and the value of the digit).
4. Generating PIN Words
Experimenting with various natural ideas to improve the standard dic-
tionary method in Section 3 suggests that we should explore another pos-
sibilities. If “distilling” PIN words from a dictionary is unsatisfactory, we
will construct suitable PIN words from randomly and uniformly generated
PINs, i.e. PINs with the highest entropy. By “suitable PIN word” we mean
a word that is easy to remember. Certainly, it is very subjective what some-
one considers as easy to memorize.
In order to allow all PINs, we must use a stretched mapping such as that
one from the previous section. We use the mapping defined by Figure 1 for
all experiments in this section. However, the methods can be easily adapted
to other mappings. The practical use of such mapping requires public avail-
ability of the mapping – a user should not be required to memorize it. It
can be achieved by printing the mapping on a numpad, displaying an image
of such numpad to user as a part of an authorization dialog, etc.
4.1. Hidden Markov Model
We model translation of PIN words to PINs as a hidden Markov model [9]
with states being letters of the alphabet and digits of a PIN being observable
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data. The problem of finding suitable PIN word will be solved by the Viterbi
algorithm.
More formally, let Q be the set of states, and V be the set of possible
outputs. Let pii denotes the probability of starting in the state i ∈ Q. The
probability of transition from the state i to the state j is denoted by ai,j .
Finally, let bi(k) be the probability of producing output k ∈ V while being
in the state i ∈ Q .
We set Q = {a,b, . . . , z}, and V = {0, 1, . . . , 9}. The parameters of our
hidden Markov model are instantiated according the particular dictionary.
The probability pii is computed as a fraction of dictionary words starting with
character i ∈ Q. The transition probability ai,j , for i, j ∈ Q, corresponds
to conditional probability that the next character is j when the current
character is i. The probability is calculated from all dictionary words. The
output probabilities will reflect the deterministic mapping of letters to digits,
i.e. for i ∈ Q and k ∈ V : bi(k) = 1 if i maps to k, otherwise bi(k) = 0.
A PIN can be generated randomly from uniform distribution and con-
verted to the most suitable PIN word by finding the most probable sequence
of states (letters) that produces this PIN in our hidden Markov model. Since
the sequence is based on the starting and transition probabilities from a dic-
tionary, the resulting PIN word should be easier to remember than other
PIN words for the same PIN. The problem of finding the most probable
sequence of states in hidden Markov model is well known, and the Viterbi
algorithm can be used to solve it.
Table 6 shows examples of PIN words computed by the Viterbi algorithm
for some randomly chosen PINs.
PIN English French German Slovak
1605 anyl anyl anzl anyk
8407 thyp thyp sizo sizo
2566 clmm clmm dlmm dlnn
35130 flbex elaex flafz ejbez
07588 zolst zoltr zoltr zojst
94381 whera viera wiera viera
Table 6: PIN words from hidden Markov model for some random PINs
The suitability of resulting PIN words is a subjective matter. However,
the results are not especially satisfying. The main problem is that there
are PINs that cannot use vowels (i.e. ‘aeiouy’) because of the particular
mapping. This situation is unavoidable, the number of vowels is smaller
than the number of digits. Therefore even using higher-order hidden Markov
model will not yield better results in such situations. As an alternative,
we can generate a set of random PINs, and user chooses the one that (s)he
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found suitable for memorization. However, this makes the PINs not uniform
anymore.
4.2. PIN phrases
Another approach is to use words instead of individual letters. The
actual PIN word is a string of the first letters from (dictionary) words in some
sentence (we call it a PIN phrase). The sentence can be user-constructed or
automatically generated. As a small experiment we implemented a simple
PIN phrase generator from PINs using English words. For each digit we
chose few nouns, verbs and adjectives with starting letter among the set
defined by the inverse of the stretched mapping. The selected words should
allow for vivid visualizations to facilitate memorization. We defined a fixed
sentence structure for the PIN length 5 – adjective, noun, verb, adjective,
noun. Some examples of generated PIN phrases for random PINs are shown
in Table 7.
PIN PIN phrase
05632 yellow lamb meets funny cat
19604 big witch makes yummy horse
90123 ugly zebra answers clean fly
38446 funny sun has happy mouse
Table 7: PIN phrases for some random PINs
A compromise between methods based on individual letters (such as the
hidden Markov model method) and PIN phrases would be using just few
words (e.g. a pair) and take two or three starting letters from each word.
For example “clear mnemonic” would represent PIN word “clmn”, i.e. PIN
2566 using our stretched mapping. Again, we can automate the process of
translating a random PIN into such words.
Generally, PIN phrases and their variants can be counted as mnemonic
techniques. They can be further combined with or modified by other mne-
monic systems, e.g. the major system. There is a vast number of possible
modifications and customizations to these methods, and it is impossible to
explore all of them here.
5. Conclusion
We analyzed several dictionary-based methods of choosing a PIN. Even
though some individual’s vocabulary is huge, the expected covering of the
PIN space and the entropy of dictionary PINs are far from ideal. However,
the results of the dictionary-based methods are much better than the statis-
tics of PINs usage observed in real-world applications. We also proposed
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two methods for constructing (hopefully) easy to remember PIN words for
randomly chosen PINs. Their practical usability is a subjective matter, and
therefore a suitable topic for further analysis and experiments.
Another interesting idea for subsequent research is the analysis of so-
called geometric PINs, i.e. PINs that are memorized according to the shape
they create on the numpad.
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